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IMAGES OF THE WOMAN JUROR
CAROL WEISBROD*
INTRODUCTION
Although jury duty has long been viewed as an important as-
pect of citizenship,' for most of American history,2 jury service
* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law; J.D., Columbia Univer-
sity, 1961.
One version of this paper was given at the Law and Society Association meeting held
in Denver in 1983, and a different version under the auspices of the Joint Committee for
Socio-Legal Studies at the University of Exeter in November, 1983. I benefited from the
discussions at both sessions.
I am indebted to Professor Saul Touster of Brandeis University for bringing to my
attention the Susan Glaspell story, A Jury of Her Peers. I am also indebted to Richard
S. Kay, Isabel Marcus, Martha Minow, Pamela Sheingorn, Aviam Soifer and Larry Yackle
for their comments on drafts. Finally, I would like to thank the editors of the HARVARD
WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL for their editorial suggestions and for their careful work with
sources.
A note on sources: It seems possible that almost any 19th or early- to mid-20th century
American treatment of women's rights, whether legal, journalistic, or fictional, might
have included at least a passing reference to the jury question. This Article is based on
printed materials from a variety of sources. It draws on a discussion over roughly one
hundred years, from the start of the women's movement to the time of Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). Although the discussions of the jury issue used here are often
fragmentary-perhaps because they are fragmentary-they are suggestive and, I believe,
representative. While the time frame is large, it appears to me that in important ways the
debate was similar over many years. I have not classified materials as "legal" or "non-
legal," or based on "actual" vs. "hypothetical" jury behavior. I have not used categories
based on civil or criminal trials, nor have I systematically stressed arguable changes in
emphasis in the historical discusssion over time. I have attempted here only a preliminary
treatment of what seemed to be the central and continuing issues.
Although the materials used are historical, the presentation is largely ahistoric, juxta-
posing quotations from different times and places to demonstrate thematic connections.
There is no attempt here to tell the story of the struggle for women's jury service in any
particular place, or to trace the development of doctrine on the subject.
' Plato wrote of participation in trials that "all should have a share, for he who has no
share in the administration of justice is apt to imagine that he has no share in the state
at all." PLATO, LAWS, quoted in J. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 10 (1960).
DeTocqueville decribed the jury as a political institution as well as an educational one.
A. DEToCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 265-66 (New York, 1838). A recent com-
mentator noted that "Ujiury service is the only remaining governmental function in which
the citizen takes a direct part." Clark, The American Jury: A Justification, in SELECTED
READINGS THE JURY 7 (G. Winters ed. 1971). See generally H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL,
THE AMERICAN JURY 3-11 (1966) (discussing the "remarkable political institution" of the
Anglo-American jury, id. at 3).
Jury duty has been described as "one of the most basic demands voiced by women."
E. FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 164 (1975). In 1792, Theodor von Hippel suggested
that the administration of justice would be "rendered more perfect" by the presence of
women. T. VON HIPPEL, ON IMPROVING THE STATUS OF WOMEN 159 (Sellner trans. 1979)
(lst ed. 1792).
2 Women were also excluded from English juries, on the basis of the doctrine of propter
defectum sexus, a "defect of sex." 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *362. A "jury of
59
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was restricted to men.3 The Supreme Court indicated in 1879 that
states could exclude women from juries, 4 and many continued to
do so, even long after the adoption of the women's suffrage
amendment.5 At the time of the Second World War, twenty-one
matrons" was sometimes used in cases relating to possible pregnancy as affecting inher-
itance, see id. at *367, or affecting punishment in the context of criminal law, see 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *388. On the early use of the jury of matrons in England,
see 16 THE LEGAL OBSERVER 306 (1838). See also Note, A Jury of Matrons, 48 AM. L.
REV. 280, 281 (1914) (jury of matrons, impanelled to investigate defendant's alleged
pregnancy, "not a very common spectacle in London"). An English statutue of 1919
authorized a judge to appoint all male or all female juries when the case required it. The
Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act, 1919, 9 & 10 Geo. 5, ch. 71, § l(b). The legislative
debate in the Commons revealed that one concern behind this act was that women,
particularly young women, should not be exposed to the "disgusting evidence" typical of
cases involving "unnatural offenses." 20 PARL. DEB. H.C. (1st ser.) 383 (Oct. 27, 1919).
See also R. v. Sutton, 53 Crim. App. 128 (1968) (judge's appointment of all female jury
for case involving manslaughter of a baby). The 1919 statute was amended so that single
sex juries can no longer be appointed. The Courts Act, 1971 ch. 23, § 35. Until 1968, jury
service in England remained a public duty which required holding property interests,
excluding most women. See W. CORNISH, THE JURY 26-28 (1968).
3 In the United States, in the 17th and 18th centuries women "juries" or committees
were used for physical examinations in witch trials. See REcORD OF GRACE SHERWOOD'S
TRIAL FOR WITCHCRAFT (Virginia 1705),74 (presented to the Virginia Historical and
Philosophical Society, 1833) (on file at HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.). See also P. BOYER AND
S. NISSENBAUM, SALEM POSSESSED: THE SOCIAL ORIGINS OF WITCHCRAFT 13 (1974)
(committee of women used to look for witch marks). See generally J. DEMOS, ENTER-
TAINING SATAN: WITCHCRAFT AND THE CULTURE OF EARLY NEW ENGLAND 180 (1982)
(committees of women in witchcraft trials).
The statutory history of women on the jury in the United States is conventionally dated
from 1898 when Utah authorized the participation of women on juries. See Taylor v.
Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 533 n.13 (1975). In fact, under Wyoming's 1869 Act to Grant to
the Women of Wyoming Territory the Right of Suffrage, and to hold Office, women served
on Wyoming juries in 1870. See Hebard, The First Woman Jury, 7 J. OF AM. HIST. 1293,
1302-03 (1913); 3 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1876-1885, at 731-38 (E.C. Stanton,
S.B. Anthony & M.J. Gage eds. 1970) (unabr. repub. of 1886 Rochester ed.) [hereinafter
cited as WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1876-1885]. Women served only infrequently on Wyoming
juries, but their presence was sometimes praised by those who thought that women were
harsh enforcers of criminal laws. See id. at 731; Train, Twelve Good Women and True,
THE SATURDAY EVENING POST, Jan. 22, 1921, at 10. See also Hebard, supra at 1316
(describing woman juror whd voted for first degree murder while knitting and saying:
"Whoso sheddeth man's blood by man shall his blood be shed."). On the history of
woman suffrage and women jurors in the Washington Territory, see S. MYREs, WESTER-
ING WOMEN AND THE FRONTIER EXPERIENCE 1800-1915, at 225 (1982).
4 See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879) (14th amendment does not
prohibit state from confining selection "to males, to freeholders, to citizens, to persons
within certain ages, or to persons having educational qualifications").
- The 19th amendment's grant of women's suffrage in 1920 did not result in automaticjury service for women, but many states were forced to consider the issue at that time
because their jury venires were comprised of all registered voters. See, e.g., Note,
Jurors-Effect of the 19th Amendment on Qualifications of Jurors, 21 ILL. L. REV. 292
(1926) (discussing cases interpreting whether 19th amendment'necessarily required wom-
en's jury service); Tried and Approved-The Woman Juror, 70 LITERARY DIGEST 46
(Sept. 17, 1921) (stating that women automatically became eligible for jury service in Ohio
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states prohibited women jurors.6 In 1962, three states still ex-
cluded women from juries.7 It was not until 1975 that the Supreme
Court held that a systematic exclusion of women from juries
violated a defendant's sixth amendment rights.8
It is easy now to attribute this exclusion of women from juries
to sexism or discrimination, but perhaps there is more that can
be said. This Article examines images of the American woman
juror in legal, literary, and journalistic discussions in the period
before service of women on juries was a widely-accepted fact of
public life. Investigation of the historical exclusion of women
from juries reveals a complicated debate about the potential ef-
fects of gender difference on women's contributions to public
life-a debate that current feminists have revived. This investi-
gation finds that both the proponents and opponents of women's
jury service shared assumptions not only about the existence of
fundamental differences between women and men, but also about
the nature of those differences. The two sides diverged, however,
in the implications they drew from those shared assumptions. To
attribute women's exclusion from juries solely to sexism is to
miss the complexity of a debate in which opposing sides often
held similar views about gender differences.
when they won the vote). See also Hildebrand, A Historical Note on Jury Service for
Women, 40 THE HUMANIST 38 (July-Aug. 1980) (discussing Taylor and history of women's
right to serve on juries).
In 1921, women's jury service in Oregon bore some resemblance to the expert jury of
matrons. Under a state statute, "in all cases in which a minor under the age of eighteen
is involved, either as defendant or as complaining witness, at least one half the jury shall
be women." 1921 Or. Laws ch. 273, sec. 10 cited in State v. Chase, 106 Or. 263, 265, 211
Pac. 920, 922 (1923) (upholding limit of six men on jury in rape trial where complaining
witness was nine year old child). The court stated that "when the quota of six men had
been taken and accepted, the remaining men were disqualified .... It was not an
exemption, but a disqualification, one such as neither the state nor the defendant could
waive, because it existed in favor of the infant witness." Id. at 267. See also Miller, The
Woman Juror, 2 OR. L. REv. 30 (1922) (discussing the Oregon law).
6 See Note, Courts-Women Jurors-Automatic Exemptions, 36 TUL. L. REv. 858, 858
n.6 (1962). In 1946, the Supreme Court on statutory grounds held that the exclusion of
women from jury panels could be highly prejudicial to defendants. Ballard v. United
States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). See infra text accompanying notes 75-80. Nonetheless,
women still did not participate fully injury service. In 1948, 15 states still denied women
the right to serve on juries. See Anderson, Jury Service for Women, 11 GA. B.J. 196, 196
(1948). In 1961, the Court upheld a Florida statute which, although allowing women to
volunteer, gave women an automatic exemption. Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961).
7 Note, supra note 6, at 858 (Alabama, Mississippi and South Carolina excluded women
from juries at that time).
8 Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 22 (1975). See D. KiP, M. YUDOF & M. FRANKS,
GENDER JUSTICE 104 (1986) ("opinion in [Taylor] turns on the very gender differences
whose relevance the Court has been at pains to deny in other contexts").
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A central assumption made by both sides in these debates was
that woman's special sphere was the home. As a result, one key
issue was the potential practical effects of a woman's jury service
on her ability to fulfill her role in the home. Another important
issue related to the impact of particular female traits: did posses-
sion of such attributes make women either unqualified or espe-
cially qualified to be jurors? Arguments on both sides of this issue
were often based on the shared beliefs that women's perceptions
of the world were different from men's, and that women had a
different, sometimes higher, moral sense.
These historical discussions anticipated themes that have been
resurrected in contemporary feminist discussions concerning
sameness and difference and the public relevance of gender. The
present feminist discussion centers on Carol Gilligan's argument
that women and men perceive and evaluate moral issues differ-
ently.9 Gilligan's In a Different Voice describes this gender dif-
ference in moral perceptions: men are associated with an ethic
of rights, and women with an ethic of caring.' 0 Gilligan's work
suggests both that women are significantly different from men
and that women's mode of analyzing moral issues in terms of
interpersonal caring is as good as, if not better than, men's. 1
Some feminists applaud this explicit discussion of women's
unique and valuable traits.' 2 "Difference feminism" is opposed,
9 See C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 'WOMEN'S
DEVELOPMENT 64-105 (1982). Gilligan states that "[a]t a time when efforts are being made
to eradicate discrimination between the sexes in the search for social equality and justice,
the differences between the sexes are being rediscovered in the social sciences." Id. at
6. She makes no "claims ... about the origins of the differences described or their
distribution in a wider population across cultures, or through time." Id. at 2.
10 Id. at 165-66.
1 Id. at 151-74.
12 See, e.g., Comments by Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, Mitchell Lecture Series, State
University of New York at Buffalo School of Law (Nov. 20, 1984), reprinted in The 1984
James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law-
A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REV. 11, 49-57, 54 (1985). Cf. Herrmann, The Virile
System, in NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS: AN ANTHOLOGY 87-89 (E. Marks and I. de Cour-
tivron eds. 1980) (if woman "adopts masculine values ... like coldness and imperialism,
she will succeed only by destroying herself .... What she gains in the social arena she
will lose on a personal level. It means nothing to allow women to participate in society
if it robs them of everything that makes them different." Id. at 89); Williams, The Equality
Crisis: Some Reflections on Culture, Courts, and Feminism, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
175, 175-76 n.2 (1982) ("[W]omen's life experiences still differ sufficiently from men's
that a diverse group of women would bring a somewhat different set of perceptions and
insights to certain issues than would a similarly diverse group of men. This observation
[Vol. 9
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however, by a strong feminist tradition that urges gender-neutral
approaches emphasizing individual, rather than group, character-
istics.13 This position treats women and men as individuals,
and discourages acting on the basis of generalizations and
stereotypes.
The choice between the two approaches raises a question for
the future of men and women which Wendy Williams recently
put this way: "Do we want equality of the sexes-or do we want
justice for two kinds of human beings who are fundamentally
different?" 14 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
question was whether women should participate in public life.
Underlying both questions are issues of gender difference and its
public significance. The debate over the service of women on
juries provides important background to the current debate on
difference feminism. The historical images of the woman juror
offer an example of the elaboration of the nature and quality of
women's "different voice."
I. THE JURY DEBATE: IMPACT OF WOMEN'S JURY
SERVICE ON THE HOME
The early debate over women's jury service was part of a more
general discussion of women's participation in the public sphere
which focused on the issue of women's suffrage. Suffragists and
about the importance of representation among decisionmakers is no less relevant to the
judiciary or to juries than to legislatures.").
In addition, feminists who opposed the idea of a draft of women, the issue in Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981), contrasted "the female ethic of nurturance and life-giving
with a male ethic of aggression and militarism and asserted that if we argued to the Court
that single-sex registration is unconstitutional we would be betraying ourselves and sup-
porting what we find least acceptable about the male world." Williams, supra at 189.
'3 This tradition, demonstrated in the Equal Rights Amendment debates, emphasizes
characteristics and abilities of individuals rather than differentiation based on sex. See
Brown, Emerson, Falk & Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional
Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871, 874 (1971) (arguing for passage of
the E.R.A. on ground that so "long as woman's place is defined as separate, a male-
dominated society will define her place as inferior").
14 Williams, supra note 12, at 200. Another feminist posed the question this way: "Do
women, who rightfully claim the instruments of public power, have cultures, traditions,
and inquiries which we should insist upon bringing to the public world?" Ruddick,
Maternal Thinking, 6 FEMINIST STUD. 342, 345 (1980).
1986]
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their opponents often assumed the existence of a natural, 5 fun-
damental difference between women and men; women were
thought to embody personal, emotional, and nurturing values,
while the male world was viewed as neutral, rational, logical, and
objective. The suffrage controversy, as well as the jury debate,
concerned, in part, whether specific qualities attributed to
women-qualities that each side wanted to protect-would be
harmed or eliminated if women as a group, and in large numbers,
participated in the public arena.
Opponents of women's suffrage insisted that political respon-
sibilities were an intrusion on home life that would injure the
family.16 The antisuffragists contended that it was only while
women were centrally associated with the home that the special
qualities of this separate sphere could exist. 17 The "antis" feared
that to the extent that women moved from the home, they would
become both estranged from the female values they needed to
preserve the home and dominated by the male values of the world
of politics, industry and the marketplace. Thus, the antisuffragists
argued that women must be exempted from the burdens of the
franchise in order to devote themselves to their proper vocations:
rearing children, maintaining the home, and perhaps, doing un-
paid work outside the home in service of charity or social re-
,s Despite these assumptions about women's natural state, it was also argued that
women's social conditioning made it pointless to speculate about what women might
"naturally" be. See J.S. MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (S. Coit ed. 1909).
16 One historian states that "[c]lose to the heart of all antisuffragist orators, particularly
congressmen, was a sentimental vision of Home and Mother, equal in sanctity to God
and the Constitution." A. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT
1890-1920, at 15 (2d ed. 1981). This sentimental vision was tied to a view of society which
rested on marriage and family. The argument based on the home was not merely a matter
of the home as a refuge for the wage earner, or a source of his domestic comfort. The
link between women, marriage, and the home were basic to an idea of marriage as the
foundation of the social order. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 165
(1878).
Despite the focus on marriage and the home, not all women were wives, of course.
English law drew a distinction between married and unmarried women. The unmarried
woman had "a legal capacity a little less than that of a male (she was excluded from
public functions) but in the exercise of private rights she was almost completely compe-
tent." W. WADLINGTON, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 195
(1984) (Successor ed. to 3d ed. 1978) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the antisuffrage movement was not solely devoted to keeping women
isolated in their homes: some who opposed suffrage supported many forms of non-
domestic activity. For a detailed treatment, see L. BROCKETT, WOMAN: HER RIGHTS,
WRONGS, PRIVILEGES, AND RESPONSIBILITIES (2d ed. 1970) (1st ed. 1869).
'7 See A. KRADITOR, supra note 16, at 96-122.
[Vol. 9
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form.18 Although some suffragists, such as Elizabeth Cady Stan-
ton, thought in terms of suffrage "revolutionizing" the home, 19
more typically, proponents of women's suffrage maintained that
women could assume these new responsibilities without aban-
doning their traditional role in the home. 20
As in the controversy over suffrage, both proponents and op-
ponents of women's jury service assumed women's nature was
fundamentally different from men's, 21 and that women's special
sphere of influence was the home. 22 The antisuffragists' concern
that women's political participation would harm the home was
even more applicable to the jury debate, because jury service
could require women to be away from home for long periods of
8 See id. at 27.
'9 Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Address at the Decade Meeting on Marriage and Divorce
(Oct. 20, 1870), reprinted in P. DAVIS, A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 61 (2d ed. 1971). See also Weisbrod & Sheingorn, Reynolds v. United States:
Nineteenth-Century Forms of Marriage and the Status of Women, 10 CONN. L. REv.
828, 830 (1978) (discussing suffrage movement as threat to women's traditional domestic
role).
See also M. WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 241 (1983). Walzer notes that the antisuf-
fragists' concern that large-scale political participation by women would introduce new
forms of conflict into kinship groups and suggests that the antis' argument "may yet prove
nearer to the truth." Id. at 244. Cf. F. TOENNIES, ON SOCIOLOGY: PURE, APPLIED, AND
EMPIRICAL (1971) (linking women to Gemeinschaft and stating that the "emergence of
women as individuals surely is a giant final step in the disintegration of age-old communal
ties").
20 Caroline Dall argued that in addition to public roles, women should continue in their
traditional role as guardian of the well-laid table: "There is no excuse for neglecting any
home duty for the most desirable foreign pursuit." C. DALL, THE COLLEGE, THE MARKET,
AND THE COURT; OR, WOMAN'S RELATION TO EDUCATION, LABOR, AND LAW 128-29
(Boston 1867).
21 See, e.g., J. HICKS, WOMEN JURORS 15 (March 1928). This pamphlet, prepared for
the National League of Women Voters, argued that "upon many matters of fact the points
of view of men and of women may be different." Id. at 15. See also M. RYAN, CRADLE
OF THE MIDDLE CLASS 190 (1981) ("Women's power, so the theory went, never assumed
a public and official dimension but worked through intimate social relations and spoke in
the meekest tones."). See generally A. KRADITOR, supra note 16, at 96-122 (discussing
the suffragists' and antis' shared assumptions about women's moral superiority and role
in the home); Bromley, Ladies of the Jury, 50 LADIES HOME J., Feb. 1933, at 108 (it is
"now generally conceded that women have certain qualities which men lack, just as men
have certain qualities which women lack").
22 See D. LIPSON, FREEMASONRY IN FEDERALIST CONNECTICUT 330-31 (1977). See
also RYAN, supra note 21, at 190 (discussing women's influence in the private sphere).
On women's nature and the separate sphere, see Welter, Anti-Intellectualism and the
American Woman: 1800-1860, 48 MID-AMERICA 258 (Oct. 1966). See also Llewellyn,
Behind the Law of Divorce: I, 32 COL. L. REV. 1281, 1293 n.30 (1932) (suggesting that
the home provides justice tempered with mercy). The "separate spheres" arguments
against jury service did not quickly disappear. See Ladies of the Jury, 2 POLAMERICAN
L.J. 21 (1939).
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time. An 1870 rhyme implied that sitting on juries might force
women to abandon their children:
Baby, baby, don't get in a fury;
Your mamma's gone to sit on the jury.23
Opponents of women jurors also seemed to fear that the in-
delicacies of jury service would interfere with women's ability to
maintain the purity required by their role in the home.24 They
expressed concern about exposing women to indelicate language:
"Criminal court trials often involve testimony of the foulest kind,"
a court noted in 1949, "and they sometimes require consideration
of indecent conduct, the use of filthy and loathsome words, ref-
erences to intimate sex relationships and other elements that
would prove humiliating, embarrassing and degrading to a lady."25
23 Hebard, supra note 3, at 1313. The argument concerning the amount of time involved
in political responsibilities was made by antisuffragists as well. A commentator in 1914
criticized antisuffragists "who insist that if a woman exercises the right of suffrage she
must neglect her duties in the home"; the antis, he claimed, illogically overlooked the
fact that "the voter does not vote all the time." S. CROTHERS, MEDITATIONS ON VOTES
FOR WOMEN TOGETHER WITH ANIMADVERSIONS ON THE CLOSELY RELATED SUBJECT OF
VOTES FOR MEN 52 (1914).
24 Concern was expressed about what the women might learn:
Juries deal with all manner of crimes, from innocuous offences to the vilest and
most revolting aberrations of the human beast. Their educations, their habits of
mind, their points of view have not prepared women to deal with such cases. A
few advanced women, a few sisters of the intelligentsia, are abreast of the last
word in criminal depravities, but the great majority of women hardly know that
such things exist.
Asking for Trouble, 114 THE INDEPENDENT 368 (Apr. 4, 1925). See also R. SUTLIFFE,
IMPRESSIONS OF AN AVERAGE JURYMAN 81 (1922) (describing women as "too fine" for
jury work except in women's cases with all women juries). Cf. In re Motion to admit
Miss Lavinia Goodell to the Bar of this Court, 39 Wisc. 232 (1875). Stating that nature
had tempered woman "little for the judicial conflicts of the court room," the Wisconsin
Supreme Court refused Goodell's application to practice law. Id. at 245. In the course of
the opinion denying bar admission to women, the court revealingly commented not only
on women, but also the nature of the legal profession, which it said, "has essentially and
habitually to do with all that is selfish and malicious, knavish and criminal, coarse and
brutal, repulsive and obscene, in human life." Id.
25 Bailey v. Arkansas, 215 Ark. 53, 61, 219 S.W.2d 424, 428 (Ark. 1949) (upholding
discretionary exclusion of women from rape trial jury). See also Sheridan, Women and
Jury Service, 11 A.B.A. J. 792, 794 (Dec. 1925) (statement of Harold B. Beitler, Phila-
delphia Bar Association secretary and trial lawyer, that he had never challenged a potential
juror "because she was a woman, except in cases where the facts to be proven were the
kind that women ought not to be called upon to discuss in the jury room").
In England and the United States, the indecency problem was sometimes raised in the
context of divorce cases. See Should Women Serve as Jurors in Divorce Cases?, 70
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Opponents also feared that a woman's purity might be compro-
mised by having to stay overnight with male jurors during long
trials.26 They argued that overnight arrangements in a hotel with
male jurors would assault a woman's sensibilities, and thus per-
haps indirectly damage those for whom she cared.
Proponents of jury service responded that when these long
cases occurred, the solution was separate quarters in a hotel
where the jurors would stay "in care of sheriffs of their own
sex."27 Moreover, the fear that jury service would force women
to abandon their families was unfounded: "Many cases do not
last longer than the average bridge party or church festival. '28
Hence, like the majority of suffragists, proponents of women's
jury service responded to their opponents' arguments without
challenging the fundamental assumption that women's sphere of
influence was the home. In fact, some proponents argued that
women were needed on juries in order to protect and support
their domain of the home. One late nineteenth century judge
argued that while men represented the worlds of work and the
battlefield, women were "peculiarly alert" to vices that "assail
the home" and thus, only women could competently represent
the home and family.29 In 1943, this theme of women jurors
protecting the home appeared in the statement that "[m]ost
women see that by jury duty and the proper enforcement of law
they protect their children as much as [by] watching over them
in the home. '30
CURRENT OPINION 511 (Apr. 1921). George Bernard Shaw objected to the assumption
underlying the English discussion, that his male "sensibilities in this matter [were] less
delicate than those of women .... Id. at 512.
16 See, e.g., WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1876-1885, supra note 3, at 736-37 (1870 letter from
Wyoming Judge J.H. Howe to the Chicago Legal News discussing overnight accomoda-
tions for a mixed jury).
21 LEGISLATIVE LEAFLET ISSUED BY THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL: BILL MAKING
vOMEN LIABLE FOR JURY SERVICE, reprinted in The Proposal to Make Women Liable
for Jury Service, 8 MASS. L.Q. 36, 40 (Feb. 1923) [hereinafter cited as BILL MAKING
WOMEN LIABLE]. The accomodations issues were still referred to in 1943, although one
woman noted that "the sentimental oratory wasted" on this issue was "ludicrous." Lutz,
Uncle Sam Needs Women Jurors, Christian Science Monitor, June 12, 1943 (Magazine),
at 6, 13.
28 BILL MAKING WOMEN LIABLE, supra note 27, at 40.
29 Judge Greene and Women Jurors, Chi. Legal News, Oct. 4, 1884, at 30, col. 4.
30 Lutz, supra note 27, at 13.
1986]
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II. WOMEN ON THE JURY: WOMEN'S PERCEPTIONS
AND ABILITY TO RENDER JUST VERDICTS
In addition to arguments about the potential effects of women's
jury service on the home, there was also debate over what effects
women's different nature would have on their service as jurors.
Women's role in the home potentially affected their ability to do
justice in two ways. First, what was perceived as their narrow
experience in the confines of the home raised questions of
whether women were sufficiently familiar with the public world
to be qualified for jury service. Second, the fundamental differ-
ences between women and men that were assumed to make the
home women's appropriate sphere could affect both their per-
ceptions about the world and the moral standards they used to
evaluate what they saw.
A. Qualifications
Women's domestic role left them vulnerable to attack on the
ground that their inexperience in business and the ways of the
world made them unqualified to serve on juries. Since many civil
cases involved commercial issues, women's limited knowledge
of the public world could be seen as a distinct disadvantage.31
Thus, it was said that their role in the home left most women "as
ignorant of the conditions and influences that surround the life of
a man as a wooden Indian. 32
Supporters of women's jury service often responded with ar-
guments based on the same assumptions as those used by their
31 Nonetheless, H.H. Sawyer suggested that women, having "fewer business and polit-
ical prejudices than men," were "less prejudiced against large corporations, such as
insurance companies, [and] railroads ... " Sawyer, Women as Jurors, 15 AM. MERCURY
139, 142 (Oct. 1928). Despite those perceived differences, Sawyer believed that there was
"no essential difference between the sexes as to their merits as jurors." Id. at 144. See
also A. TRAIN, FROM THE DISTRICT ATrORNEY'S OFFICE 348-49 (1939) ("It is too late
to question the qualifications of women to serve as jurors" because "[s]he is justly fearful
of injustice, discrimination, and brute force; and suspicious that her ignorance of business
will be taken advantage of. For these reasons where she individually is concerned she is
apt to see red and let the law go hang. But when she is called upon to administer and
enforce the law for others her very suspicions will lead her to apply it literally and
stringently.").
32 R. SUTLIFFE, supra note 24, at 81.
[Vol. 9
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opponents. The proponents argued that because of their inexpe-
rience, female jurors would listen more carefully and objectively
than would male jurors.33 As for the lack of commercial experi-
ence, the supporters argued that a woman's individual inexperi-
ence was often not as relevant as her vicarious experience. The
women jurors would, in general, be well-educated and enlight-
ened women who were the "wives, daughters and sisters of prom-
inent business and professional men whose own service on juries
it is practically impossible to procure. ' 34 Supporters also used
the predominant image of women as leading a life of domesticity
and leisure to argue that a woman's time was not worth as much
as a man's, and women "who have no especial occupation...
could easily find leisure to respond to a summons . .. -35 As
33 "Then, too, women are more careful and conscientious in their new-found duties
than men, and are particularly anxious to learn and make good in their new field. Because
of their inexperience they pay closer attention to the lawyers, the witnesses, and the
instructions of the court." Sawyer, supra note 31, at 142.
A contrary argument accused women of an inability to listen:
We go to the court house for stem, unyielding justice. Will women help our courts
to better administer justice? They will not. Nobody is qualified to decide any case
until they have heard all the testimony on both sides but the average woman would
make up her mind before the plaintiff had concluded his testimony.
Hearing on the Federal Suffrage Amendment Before the House Comm. on Woman
Suffrage, 65th Cong. (Jan. 3-7, 1918) (statement of former U.S. Senator Joseph W.
Bailey) quoted in 5 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1900-1920, at 587 (I.H. Harper ed.
1970) (unabr. repub. of 1922 New York ed.).
To counteract the argument that women were too inexperienced to serve as jurors,
some advocates of women's jury service supported the creation of schools to aid women
in this role. Dorothy Dunbar Bromley suggested that "an intelligent woman who has had
some training in sifting facts could walk into court without ever having gone to a jury
school and competently try a case as one of twelve jurors. Still," she thought that, "jury
schools [were] a good idea" since they would "teach women the fine points ofjury service
. .... Form Schools for Women Jurors in New York, 16 INDEPENDENT WOMAN 276, 294
(1937).
3 Sheridan, supra note 25, at 794 (quoting Pennsylvania U.S. District Court Clerk
George Brodbeck). Others argued that women's willingness and availability weighed
against their fitness for jury service: "Perhaps it is true that women are more willing to
serve on juries than men, but if anything, this means that they are less qualified for the
duty." Darrow, Women and Justice: Are Women Fit to Judge Guilt?, MCCALL'S 15, 65
(June 1928). Professor R. Justin Miller of the University of Oregon suggested that
[i]t is only too possible that after the novelty of the thing is over, and the subject
is no longer fresh and interesting for club-meeting discussions, the better type of
women will lose interest just as many of the better type of men have done, and
the ones who accept service will be the scandal-loving, professional juror type.
Miller, The Woman Juror, 2 OR. L. REV. 30, 45 (1922/1923).
1- Harper, Women in the Jury-Box, 20 NAT'L MAO. 40, 44 (1904).
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more women began to work in an increasing variety of occupa-
tions and professions, 36 proponents changed tactics; instead of
arguing that inexperience was a virtue, they came to simply deny
the inexperience argument on the facts. 37
B. Perceptions and Morality
The issues raised by gender differences in perception and mo-
rality were more complex than those concerning qualifications.
The assumption that differences between women and men were
so great as to require separate spheres of influence led to a further
assumption that women would contribute something unique to
the jury box. The paramount question concerned the value of
this contribution: "Will the presence of women on juries lead to
juster verdicts?"38
Proponents of women's suffrage and jury service argued that
giving political responsibility to women would allow them to
contribute to the public world the special beneficial influence they
wielded in the home. Believing that the benefits women gave to
3 At the start of the 20th century, women were represented in "virtually all" professions
and in the "great majority" of occupations. C. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE
FAMILY IN AMERICA FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 376 (1980).
37
In ancient times when women were called upon to sit on juries in specific cases,
the purpose was to refer to women those questions which the courts believed were
peculiarly within the knowledge or experience of women. The same principle
applied today would compel the presence of women in the jury box in all cases.
Barron, Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, quoted in 5 THE WOMEN VOTER'S BULL. I
(March 13, 1925). See also Sawyer, supra note 31, at 142 (1928 observation that "[w]omen
are becoming as familiar with the practical affairs of life as men").
Women's contributions during World War II further supported arguments that women
had sufficient experience to serve on juries: "'Are we going to tell our women who have
been serving as nurses on Bataan and Corregidor, who have been ferrying planes for the
Army, who have been taking men's places in war industries, that they are incapable of
being jurors?"' Lutz, supra note 27, at 6 (quoting Mrs. Leslie B. Cutler, member of the
Massachusetts legislature). Heroism in time of war has also been associated with the
French decision to grant women the franchise in 1944. See NEW FRENCH FEMINISMS 28
(E. Marks & I. de Courtivron eds. 1981).
38 Jacobs, Women Jurors, 7 AUST. L.J. 262 (1933).
It should be noted that one might discover different moral standards in particular groups
(churches, corporations, fraternities) which might be higher or lower than the "public"
standard. Questions similar to those raised here might then be considered. For example,
should Catholics serve as jurors in divorce cases? See Ringrose, The Apparent Conflict
Between Church and the Divorce Court, 21 CASE AND COMMENT 14, 16 (1914).
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the home could readily be transferred to the public world, their
goal was, as Frances Willard put it in 1888, "'to make the whole
world homelike.' ' 39 As stated by a judge in 1884, just as women
make the home a special place where goodness reigns, their
involvement in the public sphere would raise the moral level of
society: "[I]n political as well as household affairs, 'it is not good
that man should be alone.' Vices that one sex will tolerate, both
sexes, if together, will abominate and punish. '40 A suffragist at
the turn of the century perhaps best summarized the point by
saying that "the feminine heart, the maternal influence, are
needed in the court-room as well as in the home."'41
The perceptive capacities of women were sometimes seen as
superior to men's in a way particularly relevant to jury service.42
Supporters of women's jury service thought domestic virtue gave
women a heightened ability to sense the truth. A state official in
1884 offered the following in favor of women jurors: "They do
not reason like men upon the evidence, but, being possessed of
a higher quality of intellectuality, i.e., keen perceptions, they see
the truth of the thing at a glance. 43 Proponents also argued that,
39 J. LEMONS, THE WOMAN CITIZEN 85 (1975) (quoting Frances Willard of the Women's
Christian Temperance Union (W.C.T.U.)). On the W.C.T.U. and social reform, see B.
EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF DOMESTICITY: WOMEN, EVANGELISM AND TEMPERENCE IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 117-46 (1981); A. KRADITOR, supra note 16, at 110-
22.
40 Judge Greene and Women Jurors, supra note 29, at 29, col. 4. See J. ELSHTAIN,
PUBLIC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN 235-52 (1981).
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, espousing female moral superiority, stated that women were
needed to "exalt purity, virtue, morality, true religion, to lift man up into the higher
realms of thought and action" and away from "loving war, violence, conquest." Elshtain,
Moral Woman and Immoral Man: A Consideration of the Public-Private Split and Its
Political Ramifications, 4 POL. & Soc'Y 453,463 (1974) (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton).
The idea was to judge public behavior by the rigorous standards of the private sphere.
Cf. S. OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 163 (1979) (discussing Rousseau
on male and female morality).
4' Address by Lillie Devereux Blake on The Right of a Citizen to a Trial by a Jury of
His Peers, given to the National Council of Women (Feb. 23, 1891), quoted in 4 HISTORY
OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1883-1900, at 182 (S.B. Anthony & J.H. Harper eds. 1970) (unabr.
repub. of 1902 Rochester ed.) [hereinafter cited as WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1883-1900]. Blake
also invoked the idea that "in many criminal cases, such as seduction and infanticide,
women could better understand the temptations than could men." Id.
42 See C. DALL, supra note 25, at 330 (arguing that intuitive sense and ability to judge
details made women specially qualified to test evidence as jurors).
41 Statement of Wyoming Attorney-General M.C. Brown, quoted in 4 HISTORY OF
WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1883-1900, supra note 41, at 1091 app. Ohio Supreme Court Judge
Florence Allen noted the success of women jurors in Ohio who, according to at least one
"distinguished Ohio lawyer," were "'more intelligent and more conscientious than the
men jurors whom we had before."' Allen, Forward, Jury Women, WOMAN CITIZEN, Apr.
18, 1925, at 15.
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once having determined the truth, women would hold fast to their
positions, ensuring a just verdict.44
Supporters of women's jury service also argued that women's
heightened perceptions included the ability to understand other
women, whether as witnesses 45 or defendants, 46 better than men
4 See Statement of Wyoming Attorney-General M.C. Brown, supra note 43, at 1091
app. ("once settled, neither sophistry, logic, rhetoric, pleading nor tears will move [wom-
en's minds] from their purpose"). It was argued that women had been found who "take
control of the juries where they are mixed with men" and, therefore, the practical effect
of allowing women to sit on juries was to make them "more than equal to men in the jury
room." O'Connor, Ladies of the Jury, COLLIER'S, Dec. 26, 1925, at 23, The women "do
it by insisting on their opinion until the men give way, as often happens at home, and the
verdict of the women members becomes the unanimous verdict of the mixed jury." Id.
In one trial, a liquor case, the jury foreman asked the one woman juror how strongly she
felt about the case. "'So strongly' came the reply 'that I am willing to sit here for three
weeks if necessary."' Slade, Women as Jurors, WOMAN CITIZEN, Sept. 20, 1924, at 19.
The conviction "was brought in without further delay." Id.
Others argued against this position. One writer remarked that, "[w]omen by nature
seem to be less stubborn than men; they have learned to make concessions to reach
agreements." Sawyer, supra note 31, at 142. Similarly, Bromley suggested that women
jurors' "strong respect for authority" sometimes will result in following the views of a
prosecuting attorney "too slavishly." Bromley, supra note 21, at 21.
For a short story dealing with women as members of a mixed jury, see Banning, Women
Come to Judgment, 149 HARPER'S MAG. 562 (Oct. 1924).
4- See Lutz, The Case for Women Jurors, 15 INDEPENDENT WOMAN 19, 31 (Jan. 1936)
(quoting Judge Florence Allen) ("The presence of women jurors ... has stopped the
sneering of the unfeeling and the kindly motherly sympathy of women in the jury box
has drawn from witnesses the necessary details of testimony which made conviction
possible.").
For discussions of women as witnesses, see A. TRAIN, supra note 31, at 330-33 (women,
despite certain limitations, "make the most remarkable witnesses to be found in the
courts"). See also Note, Women in the Witness Box, 5 ALB. L.J. 71, 72 (1872) (suggesting
that a woman makes a good witness in part because "she is likely to be left by counsel,
from feelings of politeness, free to tell her story after her own fashion").
46 See, e.g., Address by Elizabeth Cady Stanton to the Legislature of the State of New
York (Feb. 14, 1854), reprinted in 1 HiSToRY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1848-1861, at 595-
98 (E.C. Stanton, S.B. Anthony & M.J. Gage eds. 2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited as
WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1848-1861]. Elizabeth Cady Stanton's 1854 address to the New York
State Legislature demanded in criminal cases,
that most sacred of all rights, trial by a jury of our own peers .... [S]hall an
erring woman be dragged before a bar of grim-visaged judges, lawyers, and jurors,
there to be grossly questioned in public on subjects which women scarce breathe
in secret to one another? Shall the most sacred relations of life be called up and
rudely scanned by men who, by their own admission, are so coarse that women
could not meet them even at the polls without contamination? [And] yet shall she
find there no woman's face or voice to pity and defend? Shall the frenzied mother,
who to save herself and child from exposure and disgrace, ended the life that had
but just begun, be dragged before such a tribunal to answer for her crime? How
can man enter into the feelings of that mother?
Id. at 597-98. See also Address by Rev. Antoinette L. Brown to the Syracuse National
Woman's Rights Convention (Sept. 1852), cited in WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1848-1861, supra
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could. Thus, one author claimed that in most criminal cases
where women are involved, women could "be of immense service
in clearing up evidence, and showing to the male jurors on the
panel the absurdity or impossibility of some of the statements." 47
Women's supposed greater understanding of other women led
some supporters to argue not only that women were more able
than men to do justice in cases involving women, but also that
the sexes were so different that men could not fairly judge women
at all. They claimed that men lacked knowledge of a woman's
"peculiar physical and mental organization which is requisite to
the judgment of motives and temptations. They cannot compre-
hend the variable moods and emotions, nor the power of her
impulses. It is monstrous injustice to judge women by the same
rules as men. '48 Advocates of jury service for women thought
the unfairness was greatest in cases with a female criminal de-
fendant, such as when Susan B. Anthony was tried before an all-
male jury for attempting to vote when it was still illegal for women
to do so.49
Supporters assumed that the differences between the sexes
were so great that the peers of women could only be other
women. 50 As one author argued in 1867: "Women are very much
at 524-25 (observation that justice demands that women be lawmakers and executors
when the defendant is a woman). A resolution read at an 1854 women's convention in
Albany, New York, demanded that the legislature make women "eligible to the jury-box,
whenever one of their own sex is arraigned at the bar." WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1848-1861,
supra at 594.
47 C. DALL, supra note 20, at 330.
This difference in perceptual capacity supported arguments for women to be attorneys
as well as jurors. See Pettus, The Legal Education of Women, 61 ALB. L.J. 325, 328
(1900) ("Women see quicker the confusion which is misleading the client and the utter
ignorance of law which a man cannot even imagine.").
4 WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1876-1885, supra note 3, at 737-38 (citing article appearing in
the April 14, 1870 Cincinnatti Gazette).
19 United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1873) (No. 14,459). Circuit
Justice Hunt directed a verdict of guilty and denied a request that the jury be polled. Id.
at 832. The National Woman Suffrage Association passed a resolution condemning this
"infamous decision" in 1889. See WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1883-1900, supra note 41, at 154-
56.
0 This idea was not without qualification. As one observer noted,
[iut does not by any means follow that if women were in the jury box the women
on trial would be judged by their "peers," but they would have the comfort of
knowing that those who were to decide their fate had personal knowledge of the
feelings, the temptations, the disposition and the limitations of a woman.
Harper, supra note 35, at 43.
The issue of peers, here based on gender, might be raised in other contexts. See Note.
The Case for Black Juries, 79 YALE L.J. 531 (1970).
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needed on juries. Otherwise women will never be tried by their
peers." 51 Similarly, a nineteenth century suffragist believed that
the law was "created and executed by man" and was "wholly
masculine. '52 Men could not represent women or give "impartial
justice," she argued, stating that "we can be represented only by
our peers." 53
As a result, a jury of matrons in "women's cases" 54 was one
of the objectives of those arguing for including some women, if
not solely women, on such juries.55 Occasionally, individual
judges called juries of women to serve in sensitive cases.5 6 H.H.
Sawyer noted this point in 1928, arguing that there are certain
trials-for crimes when women or girls are the victims or the
accused-where the presence of women, especially "sympathetic
motherly women, is of inestimable value in the administration of
justice.'57
-1 C. DALL, supra hote 20, at 330.
The modem American constitutional emphasis is on a "fair cross-section" of the com-
munity rather than "peers." See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975). In 1925,
Jennie Loitman Barron had argued that "a jury should represent a cross-section of the
community" and that "no cross-section of the community is complete without women."
Barton, supra note 37, at 1. Nearly 25 years later, Mathilda Fenberg referred to the
"foundation of the principle of jury service"--a "cross-section of your peers." Fenberg,
Jury Service for Women, 33 WOMEN LAW. J. 45, 47 (1947).
52 Address by Rev. Antoinette L. Brown, supra note 46, at 524.
51 Id. The argument that the sexes were so different that men could not judge women
left women vulnerable to an attack that they were fundamentally unsuited to judge men.
Thus in 1904, Ida Harper noted that men would think well of women jurors in cases
against women and children, but were most "strongly opposed to them where men are
on trial," particularly in relation to crimes against women. Harper, supra note 35, at 44.
54 It is not an easy matter to define a woman's case. If the category includes cases in
which women were parties or complaining witnesses, it also included cases in which
women were interested, e.g., "liquor cases"--hardly a rigid or fixed group of cases.
5 See Stone, A Flaw in the Jury System, 24 WOMAN'S J. 188, 188 (June 17, 1893) ("a
woman especially should have a jury of her peers, not her sovereigns, as in the case of
Lizzie Borden"). At the time of sentencing for her attempt to vote, Susan B. Anthony
protested against the court's directed verdict of guilty, saying that the prosecutors and
judges were her "political sovereigns," not her peers. See 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUF-
FRAGE 1861-1876 687-88 (E.C. Stanton, S.B. Anthony & M.J. Gage eds. 1970) (unabr.
repub. of 1881 Rochester ed.). See also Higginson, Women and Her Wishes, 4 WOMAN'S
RTs. TRAcTs 21 (1854) (arguing that "no woman's cause had ever a trial by a jury of her
peers; she may not even have half the jury composed of such as herself, though this
privilege is given to foreigners under the English laws."). The comparison between women
and alien jurors was noted decades later in England. 83 JUsT. P. 181 (April 19, 1919).
56 See, e.g., Harper, supra note 35, at 40-41 (women probation officers impaneled in
case relating to possible separation of a mother and child); see also Train, Tivelve Good
Women and True, supra note 3, at 10 (women's jury for woman defendant raising insanity
defense). For discussions of female jurors and committees of women in witchcraft trials,
see supra note 3.
"Sawyer, supra note 31, at 143.
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Inherent in some of these arguments is not only the idea that
women could better understand and therefore better judge other
women, but also the assumption that women may judge each
other according to a different standard than men would use. The
1917 Susan Glaspell story, A Jury of Her Peers,5 8 illustrates both
of these ideas. The story describes a visit to a farmhouse in which
a man has been found strangled. His wife, Minnie, is in jail,
accused of the murder. Three men, including the sheriff and the
county attorney, visit the couple's home, accompanied by two
women: one, the sheriff's wife, a woman "married to the law,"
the other, a neighbor of Minnie. The men are looking for evidence
of motive but are unsuccessful. The women look at various do-
mestic items and discover the motive. As Glaspell's biographer
Arthur Waterman says, they "are able to reconstruct the incidents
that led up to the murder by discovering in the everyday facts of
their women's world the motive that led Minnie to kill." 59 The
facts noticed by the women relate to exclusively female and
domestic matters, such as housekeeping and sewing. Thus, tiny
domestic hints discovered by other women's unique perceptive
abilities provide the critical missing evidentiary link relating to
motive. The motive relates broadly to Minnie's unhappiness with
her husband, a cold man whose temperament is suggested by the
fact that he broke open the bird cage and strangled Minnie's
songbird. Minnie, like the canary, had sung when she was a young
girl-"He killed that too." 6
The "judgment of her peers" is to keep silent about the evi-
dence they uncovered. Since the men pay little attention to Min-
nie's domestic items-and would probably not have recognized
their meaning even if they had-the effect of the women's silence
is to keep the men ignorant of the motive. Without such evidence,
the men fear that the jury will tend to acquit ("you know how
these juries are with women"). 6' The men are identified with the
38 Glaspell, A Jury of Her Peers, reprinted in THE BEST SHORT STORIES OF 1917 256-
82 (E.J. O'Brien ed. 1918). For an analysis of other fictionalized accounts of juries, see
E. Watts, From American Literature, in THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 161-77 (1975)
(discussing jury trials of characters in American fiction, poetry and drama from 1823 to
1970). Watts states that the jury in American literature is generally represented as an
"alien tribe" or group of "Odd Fellows." Id. at 175-76.
19 A. WATERMAN, SUSAN GLASPELL 29 (1961).
60 Glaspell, supra note 58, at 277.
61 Id. at 279.
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law, and the story assumes that the (presumably male) jury of
the outside world would have judged the wife guilty of her hus-
band's murder despite any amount of provocation or derange-
ment. The women are identified as love or forgiveness, but also
perhaps as a kind of higher law or higher justice.62
The story thus contains both of the assumptions found in the
historical literature: that women see things that men do not see,
at least in relation to other women, and that women and men
evaluate those discoveries differently. Although the murder is
excused by the female jury of peers, the story suggests that it
would not be justified in the actual judicial system. The women
are not merely more sensitive than men in what they see about
the woman defendant; they also seem to operate under a different
moral code. As the story is told, the crimes of neglecting Minnie,
destroying her spirit and happiness, and killing her songbird are
all related to her crime of killing her husband. These crimes by
her husband are offered as moral justification when the jury of
women decides, in effect, to acquit a murderess.
Opponents of women's jury service feared that this different
moral code might make women's verdicts unfairly biased. One
questioned: "Are women as good jurors as men? Would a jury of
twelve women reach as many unbiased decisions as one com-
posed only of men?"63 A newspaper in 1870 suggested that women
so fundamentally differ from men that "female justice" might be
something quite different from male justice:
Will women revolutionize justice? What is female justice, or
what is it likely to be? Would twelve women return the same
verdict as twelve men, supposing that each twelve had heard
the same case? Is it possible for a jury of women, carrying
with them all their sensitiveness, sympathies, predilections,
jealousies, prejudice, hatreds, to reach an impartial verdict?
62 Shall we view the behavior of the jury here as lenient (toward a murderess) or harsh
(in the sense that it involves the proposition that if A kills B's bird, B can kill A)? Or,
was it "truly just and equitable," a taking into account of a wide range of highly indivi,
dualized factorS?
6 Rose, Justice is a Woman, 157 THE OUTLOOK & INDEPENDENT 154 (Jan. 28, 1931).
In Washington State, it was suggested that women's bias in trials for "social crimes"
fluctuated, depending on the nature of the case: the sympathy of women jurors was
"largely with the accused man, where the woman complainant [was] of a vicious or
depraved character," but "young and innocent" victims were defended. Farley, Women
on Washington Juries, 75 THE INDEPENDENT 50, 52 (July 3, 1913).
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Would not every criminal be a monster provided not a
female?64
Women, then, were supposed to contribute something other
than what men provided. Yet in dealing with the familiar argu-
ment that women's participation in public life would be beneficial
and ennobling, it is necessary to recognize the scattered but
serious discussions of the idea that women's contributions would
conflict with strongly held public values. The domestic sphere
was not in fact perfect in terms of the qualities it produced in
women.
First, some values were not encouraged in the private sphere
at all, at least not for women. Charlotte Perkins Gilman, writing
in 1903, commcnted on "honour" in the separate sphere, asking,
"apart from [chastity], what sense of honour do we find in the
home-bound woman? Is it to keep her word inflexibly? '65 "A
woman's privilege is to change her mind. '66 Others wrote of
women's use of lies, though perhaps lies for good reasons. We
see this point in Dorothy Sayer's reference in 1947 to a time when
"to 'manage' a husband by lying and the exploitation of sex was
61 Women as Jurors, The Philadelphia Press, cited in WOMAN SUFFRAGE 1876-1885,
supra note 3, at 735.
In 1911, the sociologist Georg Simmel described women's bias as toward male law,
rather than toward law itself:
Frequently the "legal antipathy" of women is stressed: their opposition to legal
norms and judgments. However there is no sense in which this necessarily implies
an animus against the law itself; instead, it is only against male law, which is the
only law we have, and for this reason seems to us to be the law as such .... The
female "sense of justice," which differs from the male in many respects, would
create a different law as well.
G. SIMMEL, ON WOMEN, SEXUALITY, AND LOVE 68 (G. Oakes trans. 1984) (emphasis in
original). See also Homey, The Flight from Womanhood, 7 THE INT. J. OF PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS 324 (1926), reprinted in K. HORNEY FEMININE PSYCHOLOGY 54 (1967) (inter-
preting Simmel's theory as not implying that women are inferior).
65 C. GILMAN, THE HOME 182 (1972) (reprint of 1903 ed.). See also Woman's Defective
Sense of Honor, 44 CURRENT LIT. 410 (Apr. 1908) (discussing growing skepticism about
women's moral superiority); see generally Bromley, Diogenes Looks at the Ladies, 155
HARPER'S MAG. 671, 701 (Nov. 1927) (arguing that "there is no congenital difference
between men's and women's ethical sense" although "social and economic forces working
through the ages have dowered men with a code of fair play which, imperfect as it is, is
superior to the standards of women, whose lives have been more circumscribed").
66 C. GILMAN, supra note 65, at 182.
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held to be honesty and virtue." 67 Arthur Train suggested a con-
trast between the commitment to law and justice of women as a
class, and the lawlessness of women as individuals.6 The general
issue of the tension between the male and female values of the
public and private spheres is clear in Gilman's comment that
"[j]ustice was born outside the home, and a long way from it;
and it has never even been adopted there. '69
Second, making the public world "homelike" by extending the
"purity" and "morality" of the private sphere might itself be a
doubtful good, constituting a kind of repression in the public
sphere. Clear examples relate to temperance and social purity
goals that were often supported by advocates of women's political
rights. 70 As to these goals, women were for some too successful:
67 D. SAYERS, ARE WOMEN HUMAN? 37, 44 (1947). See also S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE
SECOND SEX 468-69 (Parshley trans. 1975) (discussion of ways in which wives control
their husbands); WOLLSTONECRAFT, A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN 36 (1967)
("Women are, in fact, so much degraded by mistaken notions of female excellence, that
I do not mean to add a paradox when I assert, that this artificial weakness produces a
propensity to tyrannize, and gives birth to cunning, the natural opponent of strength,
which leads them to play off those contemptible infantine airs that undermine esteem
even whilst they excite desire.").
On women and lies, see A. TRAIN, supra note 31, at 333 (women "are more ready, if
it be necessary, to commit perjury"). See generally Michadlis, Why Are Women Less
Truthful Than Men?, 49 MUNSEY MAG. 185 (May-June 1913) (discussing women and lies).
The Glaspell story also provides an example of women lying. The two women debate
whether to tell Minnie that her canning was ruined. They decide to bring her the one
surviving jar to convince her that nothing went wrong: "If I was you I wouldn't tell her
her fruit was gone! Tell her it ain't. Tell her it's all right-all of it. Here-take this [the
one surviving jar] in to prove it to her!" Glaspell, supra note 58, at 279. It is a progression
from concealment to a lie, to, finally, a truth put forward to prove a lie, so that the woman
in jail will not know that her fruit has been ruined. The scene anticipates the women
concealing the evidence. For a lie in the form of forgery, see the first act of Ibsen's A
Doll's House. Nora attempts to justify her act as follows: "Do you mean to tell me that
a daughter has no right to spare her dying father worry and anxiety? Or that a wife has
no right to save her husband's life?" Ibsen, A Doll's House, reprinted in SIX PLAYS BY
HENRIK IBSEN 29 (E. Le Gallienne trans. 4th ed. 1957).
Others argued that women were honest in their role on juries, see Allen, supra note
43, at 15 ("From every direction I hear the same thing, that the women are intelligent;
that they do not allow their sympathies to sway them in the consideration of the evidence,
and that they are extremely honest in voting upon the verdicts.").
For an English discussion of the personal and domestic morality of women, see A.
WRIGHT, THE UNEXPURGATED CASE AGAINST WOMAN SUFFRAGE 40-48 (1913). See also
Webb, Introduction to Special Supplement on the Awakening of Women, THE NEW
STATESMAN, Nov. 1, 1913, at iii (commenting that Wright argued "in a circle-deducing
from the very effects of subjection on the subject sex, class, or race a justification for
continued subjection").
68 A. TRAIN, supra note 31, at 348. Train ascribes the "lawlessness" of individual women
to their sense that they are "privileged and exceptional." Id.
69 C. GILMAN, supra note 65, at 172.
70 The 18th and 19th amendments to the United States Constitution related to each
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Emma Goldman referred to the anti-obscenity crusader Anthony
Comstock when she described the moralism of women reformers
in the West and asked, "Could Brother Comstock do more?"71
It seems, in short, that the question of whether women could
"do justice" related to complex matters. Such matters included
concern about the impact on larger social processes of the ma-
ternalism and compassion of the private sphere sensibility, and
more negatively, a concern about the narrowness, ignorance, and
petty tyranny of the figure we might recognize as Philip Wylie's
,,Mom.,,72
Such observations were, perhaps, at the root of another mode
of arguing for women's jury service, one based less on the special
contribution that women could make to the public sphere than
on the broadening influence jury service would have on women
themselves. Thus, it was argued that women's presence on juries
would produce a "new conception of government and of [wom-
en's] rights and privileges, as well as their duties and responsi-
bilities under it."' 73 Suffrage and jury service, in freeing the talents
and energies of women, held the potential of bringing a "female
renaissance" with them.74
CONCLUSION
In 1946, the Supreme Court held in Ballard v. United States75
that "the exclusion of women from jury panels may at times be
other in a way which is often now forgotten. Woman suffrage and prohibition were linked
in a number of countries. See R. PAULSON, WOMAN'S SUFFRAGE AND PROHIBITION: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF EQUALITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL (1973).
71 E. GOLDMAN, ANARCHISM ALND OTHER ESSAYS 209-11 (1970).
72 P. WYLIE, GENERATION OF VIPERS 184-204 (1942) (novelist and critic Wylie devel-
oped several social types including "Mom" and "Cinderella"). See also T. BEER, THE
MAUVE DECADE 17-64 (3d ed. 1980) (the "Titaness" as an American phenomenon). This
image is sometimes visible in personal accounts of jury service. See Rose, supra note 63,
at 154.
73 Sawyer, supra note 31, at 144.
74 Women Jurors, 15 LAW NOTES I (Apr. 1911). See also J. HICKS, supra note 21, at
15 (arguing that jury service would enlighten women about the judiciary and responsibil-
ities of citizenship).
Similar points were made about legal education. See Pettus, supra note 47, at 327 (legal
education is as useful to women as it is to men and "'tends to make the mind more
reasonable, consistent, logical and well-balanced"').
7S 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
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highly prejudicial to the defendants." 76 In dismissing the indict-
ment against a mother and son for a religious mail-fraud scheme
because women had been excluded from their jury, Justice Doug-
las emphasized gender differences: "The truth is, that the two
sexes are not fungible; a community made up exclusively of one
is different than a community composed of both."'77
The Ballard opinion presents the image of a woman juror who
is motherly, spiritual, sensitive, and religious. 78 The Court rea-
soned that such a woman might well evaluate a mother's religious
activities differently than would men. Although the Court be-
lieved that the testimony in the case established that Mrs. Bal-
lard's pursuits in the name of Christian Science constituted a
"vile conspiracy, '79 it thought a religious woman juror might
respond very differently. She might, as "a sensitive woman,
highly spiritual in character, rationalize all the money income
acquired by Mrs. Ballard as being devoted to the teachings of
S.. Jesus. '80
One possible modem response to these judicial statements is
to dismiss them as the sexist product of an earlier time. As the
historical materials discussed here illustrate, however, to label
these judicial statements "sexist" is to miss the point that such
"antiquated prejudices" 81 were reflectiofis of the assumptions of
many in the woman's movement, as well as of the larger society.
The arguments for the political rights of both the vote and jury
service were associated with an argument based on women's
special social role. Although even supporters of political rights
for women sometimes saw the female contribution in negative
terms, the particular values women might bring to the jury were
generally classified positively in terms of compassion, maternal-
ism, sensitivity, and understanding.
Another possible response to the Ballard opinion might be to
recognize that the Court's assumption that women and men may
indeed bring a different moral calculus to jury deliberations in-
volves more than sexism. In the current discussions of the public
76Id. at 195.
77 Id. at 193-94.
78 See id. at 194-95 (quoting Judge Denman's Circuit Court dissent).
79 Id. at 194 (quoting Judge Denman's Circuit Court dissent).
10 Id. at 195 (quoting Judge Denman's Circuit Court dissent).
81 Jury Service Deferred, 14 WOMAN'S J. 28 (1929).
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relevance of gender, Carol Gilligan's "different voice"8 2 relies on
similar images.
The implications of Gilligan's analysis have been widely dis-
cussed. On the one hand, Gilligan's work supports a version of
feminism that, for some, is richer than gender-neutral ap-
proaches. Her argument seems consonant with many women's
sense of their own experiences, particularly in relation to chil-
dren-experiences which some feel have either been denied or
denigrated by some feminists. Gilligan's theory also fits with the
works of some current legal writers who emphasize experience
and "consciousness." These authors do not focus on the internal
aspects of legal doctrine as is typical of legal writing. Instead
they emphasize people's subjective perceptions of law and the
law's treatment of individuals.83 Gilligan's discussion is also sup-
ported by work in anthropology and other disciplines that views
women as operating in a separate but important sphere. These
approaches have found that women are not merely victims rele-
gated by men to an inferior role,84 but are also leaders of a
separate and significant sphere, with a power base of their own
which is different from men's, but no less important to the society
as a whole.85
On the other hand, the inquiry raised by difference feminism
was highly troublesome for some feminists, and continues to be
so.8 6 First, they are concerned that the entire inquiry is premised
on group behavior, and therefore, may reintroduce stereotyping.8 7
82 See supra text accompanying notes 10-12.
83 See, e.g., Minow, "Forming Underneath Everything That Grows": Toward a History
of Family Law, Wsc. L. REv. (1986) (forthcoming) (on divergence of legal and self-
image); J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 1 (1976) ("central place of the
human person in any account of law").
" For legal discussions of sex discrimination, see B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E.
NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 5 (1975); Taub & Schneider,
Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE POLITICS OF LAW:
A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 117 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). See generally Ginsburg, Gender and
the Constitution, 44 U. CIN. L. REv. 1 (1975) (discussing the constitutional aspects of
the American sex role debate). As a general point, it seems that the legal discussion has
tended to focus on breaking down sexual stereotyping and the discrimination based on
stereotyping. See generally Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447 (1984)
(recognizing that women tend to perceive social relations and approach moral issues in
distinctive ways and speculating on the consequences of a reconstruction of constitutional
law to include that distinctive morality and worldview).
85 See Rosaldo, The Use and Abuse of Anthropology: Reflections on Feminism and
Cross-cultural Understanding, 5 SIGNS 389 (1980).
86 See supra text accompanying note 13.
87 For discussions of the harms of stereotyping, see Johnston & Knapp, Sex Discrimi-
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The research, though descriptive of many women, could easily
lead to a normative conclusion regarding what women should be.
Such a conclusion could reinforce the position espoused by Jus-
tice Bradley in his concurring opinion in Bradwell v. Illinois,88
the 1872 case denying Myra Bradwell's claimed right to practice
law. The law, Bradley stated, was adapted to the generality of
things. While there were of course women who were different
and thus not like the majority of women, he argued that there
was no reason for the law to take particular cognizance of them.89
It is all too clear that assumptions about gender differences can
be used by the opponents of women's rights to limit women's
role in the political world.
This Article has attempted to complicate our own images of
the current controversy over women's differences by demonstrat-
ing the long history in America of emphasis on the relevance of
gender-emphasis both by feminists and by those opposing po-
litical participation by women. This historical background can
perhaps provide a clearer, if more complex, understanding of the
current discussion of gender.
nation by Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 676 (1971)
(arguing that American judges have a poor record on sex discrimination because they
make "unjustified (or at least unsupported) assumptions about individual capabilities,
interests, goals, and social roles solely on the basis of sex differences"). See also Note,
Toward a Redefinition of Sexual Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 487 (1981) (courts should
use alternatives to the dominant assumptions about sex roles). Cf. T. SOWELL, ETHNIC
AMERICA 293 (1981) (stereotyping, i.e., judging individuals on the basis of group char-
acteristics, may be unjust to individuals who deviate, but is efficient way for employers
to make judgments in the absence of infinite resources for gathering information).
' 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873).
89 Many women, he wrote,
are unmarried and not affected by any of the duties, complications, and incapacities
arising out of the married state, but these are exceptions to the general rule. The
paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfill the noble and benign offices
of wife and mother. This is the law of the Creator. And the rules of civil society
must be adapted to the general constitution of things, and cannot be based upon
exceptional cases.
Id. at 141-42. See Kay, The Equal Protection Clause in the Supreme Court 1873-1903,
29 BUFFALO L. REV. 667 (1980).
The sexism of the Bradley, Swayne, and Field concurrence in Bradwell is often men-
tioned. Perhaps we might recall also the sexist stereotyping of Matthew Hale Carpenter,
arguing for Myra Bradwell: "There may be cases in which a client's rights can only be
.rescued by an exercise of the rough qualities possessed by men. There are many causes
in which the silver voice of woman would accomplish more than the severity and sternness
of man could achieve." 83 U.S. at 137.
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